The Rubicon in Turkish - US ties
Turkey did not help the United States on Iraq at a critical moment and has turned into the most anti-American country, mainly due to the PKK issue and Washington’s currying favor with the Iraqi Kurds. In return the U.S. is not prepared to go that extra mile to help Turkey over the PKK in a way that is meaningful, or listen to Ankara concerning other political issues relating to northern Iraq.
The same U.S. that got rid of Ansar al-Islam in a short space of time could not be bothered about getting rid of the PKK in the same region, even though it classifies this group as terrorist also.
If we are to look at the latest remarks by the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Nabi Şensoy, the gravity of the dire situation in bilateral ties becomes apparent.
According to Şensoy, U.S. backed Iraq Kurds are transferring U.S. arms to the PKK.
These arms, Turkish officials say, are then used to kill Turkish soldiers. Ergo, Washington is indirectly backing the PKK.
The Chief of the General Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanıt not so long ago, made a similar claim. If the country’s most senior soldier, and one of its most important ambassadors are saying this, then there is only one option for simple members of the public; and that is to believe that there must be something in what is being said.
One can only imagine the counter riposte in private from U.S. military and civilian officials to such remarks. Ripostes, which are no doubt colored with the usual expletives. It is interesting to note, however, that U.S. officials do not go public with these, and this is where the wonder lies.
Strategic ties?
Technically speaking the two countries should by now have consolidated their bellicose positions and turned this into one of extreme political opposition to one another, if not into open enmity. But the pretense of strategic ties is maintained, no doubt for big picture considerations.
The highly visible inability by both sides to come to a comprehensive arrangement on how to define their strategic relationship has not altered this. There are concrete reasons for this, of course.
The Turkish military establishment has a relationship to maintain with its U.S. counterpart that is more than just military. Defense industry ties run deep and are significant for both sides.
Then there are the operational ties that have evolved out of having worked closely together for 50 years within NATO, as well as bilaterally, against the Soviet threat.
There is also the fact that the U.S. still draws military benefits from Turkey, even if these are largely reduced when compared to Cold War years.
The bases in Turkey allocated to the U.S. military are a case in point. Even though the Turkish side has put restrictions on how these are used or at least the public has been led to believe that such restrictions have been put it is clear that the American side cannot overlook the logistical value of these bases yet.
There are reports that Washington is working on alternatives in northern Iraq, Romania, Bulgaria and Azerbaijan, and given the way Turkish U.S. relations are going, it is not hard to believe some of this speculation.
Turkey’s strategic placing on the map, however, means that its military value, though much diminished, will not disappear anytime soon. No doubt the Turkish side is banking on this and feel free in issuing salvoes such as those by Ambassador Şensoy due to this.
But how long can this pretence be maintained? Once the two countries wake up to the fact that they are not friends anymore, where to they go from there? It is not clear whether policy planners on both sides are giving serious consideration to such questions.
Obviously Ankara is obsessed with the PKK issue and developments in northern Iraq, while Washington is obsessed with developments in Iraq as a whole. Clearly such obsessions act as blinders for both sides, preventing them from seeing what lies ahead.
In fact Washington could change the mood overnight with meaningful steps against the PKK that can be seen as genuine by the public. But it is not doing so. If this was done, it would also lift the threat of a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq, a prospect which appears to worry Washington enough to issue warnings against such a move.
It’s equally clear, however, that Ankara will not lift this threat until the PKK is acted against. Some even suggest that Ankara is happy about the present state of affairs because it means it has placed a Democles’ sword over the Iraqi Kurds, with whom its real problem is.
A dialogue of the deaf
Put another way, if Washington acted against the PKK in northern Iraq, Turkey would have no legitimate reason to threaten a cross-border operation or an invasion into what many Americans believe is the most stable part of Iraq, and the only good story to come out of that country.
We have for a long time been referring to a dialogue of the deaf between Turkey and the U.S. over Iraq. It seems that this continues unabated, and as it does bilateral ties keep going from bad to worse.
Whether the point of no return has been passed yet or not is not clear. Ambassador Şensoy’s remarks suggest that we are near the Rubicon, even if it has not been crossed yet.