Time to talk about scenarios and possibilities
With the endorsement of the cross-border bill by Parliament Wednesday, Turkey has stepped into a new period of uncertainties.
I am one of those who know that the motion approved does not mean an imminent “military operation” in depth because I am aware that the government presenting the proposal to Parliament, or more precisely, to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, does not have any “sincere” “intention” to intervene in northern Iraq. In fact, Erdoğan and Deputy Prime Minister and Government Spokesman Cemil Çiçek issued statements implying that they do not wish a military operation in northern Iraq. The government gives a picture that they were forced to prepare and submit such a proposal because of the internal dynamics occurred in the aftermath of the latest attacks of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). That is to say logic of politics left the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) no choice but to prepare and present the bill.
This is the source of the problem because the government made a “strategical decision” which is not of its own strategy. If you do not have a strategy you will be hurled by developments. Naturally, this brings the following question to mind: From now on, will Erdoğan be able to control developments or will he be controlled by the developments?
The point reached indicated that the latter is most likely to take place.
To tell the truth, opposition parties must have sensed the round words written in the text and sensed that the bill was prepared willy-nilly, so raised objections in the direction that a “military operation” should also cover Massoud Barzani and his peshmergas.
The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli clearly stated this “developed target” on Tuesday, and it was voiced by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) spokesman Şükrü Elekdağ in Parliament plenary on Wednesday; possibly the General Staff thinks alike. We should go back and check what the Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt said in his famous statement on Apr. 12.
What is the target?
In Ankara, I attended a closed meeting on Tuesday where a retired general closely known by the ruling party, MHP representatives and the public delivered a speech. He said the language used in the cross-border bill does not define a specific “enemy” for the military operation and the “target” is not self-evident. And, he asked, “What will be done to Barzani backing the PKK?”
The target is inferred discretely as the PKK, he added. In this case, if the military operation does not eliminate the PKK, they will turn around and say, “See, we gave a chance to the military, but they couldn’t do it.” This is the reason why the document was written as is, he said criticizing the government.
Turkey now has a cross-border motion in hand for a military operation in northern Iraq, but obviously not a full “national consensus” on its enforcement has yet reached in Ankara.
What’s cooking?
There are different scenarios. Language of the bill gives the government a kind of multiple-entry Schengen visa to Iraq for a period of one year. In a way, its content, or military requirements, will be determined by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK).
All the “signals” reinforce the possibility of pin-point strikes, raids and “hit and run” attacks by Special Forces whenever needed.
That is to say, an operation giving the impression that northern Iraq is “occupied” by tanks, cannons, brigades or army corps is slightly possible. The language used in the text emphasizing “territorial integrity of Iraq is not the target” weakens such possibility anyway. However, the public opinion’s expectations are in the direction of a full force operation.
Meanwhile, a U.S. strike on the PKK targets or a move to capture some PKK leaders and their return to Turkey (to prevent a major damage in Turkish-American relations, by running over the Iraqi Kurdish leaders and even by annoying them) may eliminate the reason for a “cross-border operation” the way the Turkish government actually desires.
Does the U.S. do this, which has not been done until today, or could it do it?
Perhaps the U.S. could do this because of the pressure naturally felt due to the bill, of the trump card Turkey handed in and of the tension in Turkish-American relations caused by the Armenian bill. Americans, running over Kurds, raided the Süleymaniye Palace Hotel in the city of Süleymaniye last week and detained an Iranian. In a similar act last year in Arbil, Americans again arrested a group of Iranian, as announced to be diplomats by the U.S., despite the protests of Barzani.
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As it is seen, we have reached a phase of “military operation scenarios” by the parliamentary approval of the bill. But there is another possibility which is not uttered much often: The PKK soon may stage a few attacks similar to those killed 13 soldiers in Gabar recently and may escalate the violence, but to kill many this time.
Such a development blows up all scenarios which we speculated above. On such an occasion, a ‘’tsunami'’ of rage in Turkish public opinion might very doubtfully prevent “pin-point operations” planned for an unknown time frame and style.
That necessitates a large-scale operation. It might be brought to the agenda that Turkey could cross mountains in northern Iraq and shift the border in an area of 20-40 kilometers in depth so as to form a new “security border,” as the late former prime minister, Bülent Ecevit, said some time ago.
In fact, formation of a 20 kilometer “buffer zone” by the TSK was discussed in an agreement reached, but not enforced, before the March 1 deployment motion which was turned down by Parliament.
Then, what is it next?
We don’t know.
All we know is that we have started to study these possibilities and scenarios after the approval of the cross-border bill by Parliament on Wednesday.
Therefore, the question that needs an answer hereafter is: Will Erdoğan be able to control developments or will the developments control Erdoğan…?