What will the political merger on the right bring?
While mergers may appear good to the public and represent a breakthough for generally bellicose Turkish politics, it may mean little in real terms in the end.
The much touted unity on the so called “left” wing of the Turkish political spectrum may or may not have taken place as you read these lines. If it does we will consider it a minor miracle and leave the analysis of whether this means anything in terms of electoral prospects for another time.
Let us today look instead at the “unity on the right” that has taken place between the True Path Party (DYP) lead by Mehmet Ağar, and the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) lead by Erkan Mumcu, under the banner of the “New Democratic Party” (YDP).
Good news, but…
It is a major breakthrough in Turkey’s highly fractured and fractional political environment for parties to merge in this way. So this merger must be welcomed for that, if nothing else, as it represents a turning point of sorts. The question, however, is will this enhance the prospects of the YDP in the elections that are now planned for July 22.
This question becomes more relevant when it is considered that both parties harmed themselves during the debacle surrounding the attempt by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to have Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül elected as president.
Both Mehmet Ağar and Erkan Mumcu said openly at the time that the claim by the main opposition Republican Peoples Party (CHP), that there needs to be at least 367 deputies in Parliament on the day of the election for a valid quorum, was not correct. Both claimed that a minimum of 184 deputies would represent the necessary quorum.
Both however, went on to force their deputies not to attend the voting and thus prevented 367 deputies assembling after the Constitutional Court accepted the CHP’s argument on this issue. Put another way, while maintaining that they did not agree with the CHP, both the DYP and ANAVATAN actually served the interests of this party much to the chagrin of their natural supporters.
Many analysts maintain that this has shifted angry DYP and ANAVATAN voters to the AKP, and it remains to be seen now if the same thing applies for the YDP, which resulted from the merging of DYP and ANAVATAN.
What about the heritage of the old DP?
Both Ağar and Mumcu define themselves as secular Kemalists. But it is also a fact that the Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes, which they hark back to and constantly pay tribute to, and whose name they have given to their new party, was the first party – after Turkey moved to a multi-party system in the late 1940s – to play to religious sentiments of the country’s conservative masses.
It was the DP, for example, which had reverted back to the call to prayer being done in Arabic, while the founding fathers of the Republic had stipulated that this should be done in Turkish so that the masses could understand it.
Put another way both Ağar’s and Mumcu’s party’s have grass roots, now a shared grass roots, that can shift easily from one conservative party to another. This means that, unlike the traditional supporters of the CHP, it is not difficult for their supporters to move to the AKP if they feel disappointment with the YDP or its predecessors.
It is also a fact that these grass roots supporters are sensitive about the issue of headscarves for girls who want to go to university, for example. As matters stand Mumcu and Ağar have had to take positions close to the AKP on this issue in the past.
It remains to be seen how the YDP will address issues such as these now. Neither have they given much indication as to what their policies vis a vis the economy and some of the burning issues that Turkey is confronted with at the moment will be.
There is also the fact that Ağar has alienated significant portions of the conservative as well as nationalist population with his rather liberal approach to PKK militants in the mountains, when he said he would prefer that they come down to the valley and engage in politics, rather than stay in the mountains and fight with guns.
As for Mumcu, many will not forget that he served under the AKP as minister, and is therefore not totally against this party in principle, as the CHP has consistently been. All this means that the “devil you know is better than the devil you do not know” syndrome may work against both Ağar and Mumcu to the benefit of Prime Minister Erdoğan and his party.
In addition to this there is a widespread notion that the AKP has not in fact managed the economy badly and the fear that a change in government might shake the relative stability achieved. In this case the “do not change horse in midstream” syndrome may come into play to the advantage of Erdoğan.
The short of all this is that while mergers may appear good to the public and represent a breakthrough for generally bellicose Turkish politics, it may mean little in real terms in the end.